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Abstract 
This paper describes a security architecture designed to 
support role-based access control for distributed object 
systems in a large-scale, rrzulti-organisational enterprise in 
which domains are used to group objects for specifying 
security policies. We use the concept of a role to deJine 
access control related to a position within an organisation 
although our role framework caters for the specification of 
both authorisation and obligation policies. Access control 
and authentication is implemented using security agents on 
a per host basis to achieve a high degree of transparency to 
the application level. Cascaded delegation of access rights 
is also supported. The domain bused authentication service 
uses symmetric cryptography and is implemented by 
replicated servers which maintain minimal state. 
1 Introduction 
Distributed systems are increasingly being used in 
commercial environments necessitating the development of 
trustworthy and reliable security mechanisms. These must 
prevent unauthorised access to resources, compromise of 
information integrity or loss of confidentiality. Distrib- 
ution requires the need for encryption over untrusted 
networks and remote computers may not be fully trusted. 
Distributed systems may contain millions of objects and 
cross inter-organisational boundaries forcing decentral- 
isation of security management. There is often no clear 
informal or formal specification of enterprise authorisation 
policies and no tools to translate policy specifications to 
access control implementation mechanisms such as 
capabilities or Access Control Lists. It is thus difficult to 
analyse the policy to detect conflicts or flaws and it is 
difficult to verify that the implementation corresponds to 
the policy specification. 
This paper gives the overview of a security architecture 
to support an access control model that makes use of 
domains, explicit policy objects and roles. Domains [l] are 
used to group objects to which a common policy applies, 
to partition management responsibility in large systems or 
for the convenience of humans (c.f. file system 
directories). Domains can contain subdomains to form a 
hierarchical structure. A role identifies the rights, duties, 
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functions and interactions, associated with a position such 
as vice president, board director, security administrator, 
doctor or nurse in a hospital. We model rights as 
authorisation policies which specify what activities a 
subject is permitted (or forbidden) to perform on a set of 
target objects. Duties are modelled as obligation policies 
which specify what activities a subject must or must not 
perform on a set of target objects. A role is the set of 
authorisation and obligation policies which have a 
particular role position as a subject [2], although we focus 
only on authorisation policies in this paper. The advantage 
of using roles for specifying enterprise policies is that 
individuals can be assigned to or withdrawn from the role 
positions without having to respecify the policies 
applying to the role. An object oriented approach to 
specifying roles permits multiple instances of a basic role 
to be instantiated e.g. for each nurse in a hospital. 
We provide a framework in which roles and inter-role 
relationships represent enterprise security requirements. 
Roles are expressed in terms of policies which refer to 
domains to provide a very flexible basis for specifying 
Role Based Access Control [3] which caters for large scale, 
inter-organisational distributed systems. High-level 
abstract policies can be defined and then refined into a 
number of implementable policies. Further information on 
roles can be found in [4] while this paper concentrates on 
the security aspects of the architecture 
The security architecture enforcing the access control 
consists of four main building blocks: the domain service, 
the policy service, the authentication service and the 
security agents which are employed on each host to 
achieve a high degree of transparency of the security 
services to the application level. The distributed domain 
service (discussed in section 2.1) maintains information on 
domain membership and the policies applying to domains. 
The policy service (see section 3.1) allows specification 
and refinement of policies by human users. These policies 
are then disseminated to the distributed agents which 
implement them. The access control model is described in 
Section 2 as well as more detail of how roles are specified 
in terms of domains and policies. Section 3 describes the 
security agents needed in each host for authentication and 
access control. 
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2 Access control policies and roles 
Our access control model is based on subjects invoking 
operations on targets where the subject or target may be 
active or passive objects. Objects may be representatives 
of a user (c.f. login shell), distributed agents acting on 
behalf of users, devices, files or components of a service. 
An object has a unique Object Identifier (OD) which 
contains the network address of the object and an element 
which is always unique. 
2.1 Domains 
In a large system many objects or users may exhibit 
common characteristics with respect to some criteria, so it 
is useful to specify policies that apply to a group of 
objects rather than individual ones. A domain is an object 
which maintains a list of references to objects that have 
been explicitly grouped together to reflect the needs of 
users or management [2]. Domains provide similar 
functionality to groups in traditional access control 
systems but are used to group targets as well subjects. If a 
domain holds a reference to an object, the object is said to 
be a direct member of that domain and the domain is said 
to be its parent. Domains can also be nested in that a 
subdomain may be a member of a parent domain and the 
subdomain members are then indirect members of the 
parent. An object can be a direct or indirect member of 
multiple domains. 
Multiple domain servers store the domain membership 
information and a domain server is trusted to certify 
membership of objects in the domains it maintains. The 
domain servers may be managed by principals that 
represent different interests and so are trusted to different 
extents. The access control decision making, which is 
based on the domain membership of the objects, cannot 
rely on a single authority certifying this membership. 
2.2 Access control policies 
We consider a policy in its simplest form to be a 
relationship between a subject and a target. An obligation 
policy determines what operations the subject must (or 
must not) invoke on the target object, but are beyond the 
scope of this paper - see [5] for further details. 
An autlzorisation or access control policy determines 
what operations the subject is permitted (positive 
authorisation) or forbidden (negative authorisation) to 
perform on the target. We allow the use of negative 
authorisation policies at the specification level as they are 
found in enterprise policies e.g. students are not permitted 
to reboot the workstations. The security architecture only 
enforces positive policies with the assumptions that 
actions not explicitly authorised are forbidden and that a set 
of policies containing negative authorisation policies can 
be retined into a set containing only positive ones. 
A policy specifying abstract activities can be refined 
into a hierarchy of more specific abstract policies and 
eventually into enactable leaf-level policies that can be 
enforced by the access control agents. An implementable 
positive access control policy specifies the operations that 
objects in the subject domain are permitted to perform on 
objects in the target domain e.g. operations opl ,  op2 on 
objects of type T1, and operations opl ,  op3 on object of 
type T2. In addition, a policy may impose constraints such 
as a validity time for the policy (e.g. 09-17.00) or required 
encryption for the invocation and reply data [ 11. 
By default, policies propagate to subdomains and hence 
to indirect members of parent domains. In some cases it is 
useful to be able to restrict the propagation to only direct 
members or to certain combinations of subdomains. We 
use domain scope expressions to specify groups of objects 
in terms of set operations on domains and objects e.g. 
*DomA * "DomB specifies the objects that are direct or 
indirect members of both DomA and DomB. 
The notion of the access control policy has been 
extended to deal with the delegation of access rights 
whereby an object authorises a possibly remote agent to 
act on its behalf to access a service. Objects are not all 
equally trusted so it is necessary to control what access 
rights can be delegated to which objects and the possession 
of a right does not imply the right to delegate it. For these 
reasons, there is a need for a policy scheme that enables 
the determination of i) The Grantor, i.e. who can delegate, 
ii) The Grantee, i.e. to whom rights can be delegated, iii) 
The Delegatable rights, i.e. what rights the grantor is 
permitted to delegate to the grantee. 
An Extended Access Control Policy, (Fig. 2.1) is used 
to control delegation of access rights. It determines that 
objects in the Subject scope can delegate to objects in the 
Grantee scope the right to perform operations, specified in 
the Operations field, on objects in the Target scope. 
Cascaded delegation is allowed provided that all grantees 
are in the Grantee scope of the policy. Our scheme does 
not impose constraints on the order of the delegation steps 
(c.f. [6]).  
Subject Scope Target Scope 
Figure 2.1 : Graphical representation of an 
Extended Access Control Policy 
2.4 Roles 
We use the concept of a Role associated with a position 
so that policies can be specified with respect to 
organisational positions and describe the duties and access 
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rights of the individuals assigned to the positions. This 
means that the policies do not have to be respecified when 
individuals are assigned to new positions. 
A role is composed of a Role Position Domain (RPD) 
and a set of access control and obligation policies which 
have the RPD as a subject. An RPD represents a position 
or status within the organisation, for instance security 
administrator, secretary, doctor [7]. The organisational 
structure, however, cannot be fully represented by roles 
since individuals interact and co-operate with each other. 
The responsibility of the individuals assigned to roles 
includes the relationships to other roles e.g. supervision of 
work. These relationships include the policies between 
related roles (e.g. WardlO-doctor is permitted to assign 
tasks to Ward1 0-nurse) and when and how they can access 
shared resources such as patient files. Relationships also 
include the interaction protocols defining the exchange of 
information and the concurrency constraints on the 
activities of the related roles. Thus, our framework 
identifies for a role position: i) the access control and 
obligation policies related to target objects, ii) the 
interactions between roles which reflect organisational role 
relationships, and iii) both intra- and inter-role concurrency 
constraints. The complete role model is defined in more 
detail in [4]. 
This paper only deals with simplified security roles 
composed of a RPD and a set of positive access control 
policies. A generic role can be specified as a role class in 
terms of policies which define a set of permitted activities 
e.g. for a nurse. These could be further specialised e.g. for 
a surgical nurse [SI. Multiple instances of surgical nurses 
could be created each with their own position and target 
domains. The nurse assigned to Ward10 would be 
responsible for a different set of target patients from the 
nurse assigned to Ward9. The access control policies 
associated with a role i.e. which have the RPD as subject 
domain define the access privileges of the individuals 
assigned to that role. Individuals can be assigned to or 
removed from a role without changing the policies and 
relationships specified for the role. 
- - - "_ _ _  
Subject I 
Role Position I 
Role 
Authorisation , Targets 
Assigned 
to Role 
ROLE 
- - - -  - __ _ _ - _ I  
User Representation 
Domain (URD) 
Figure 2.2: A human manager assigned to a 
role 
A user is permanently represented within the system by 
a User Representation Domain (URD). The user is 
assigned to a position and thus to the corresponding role 
by including her URD in the RPD (see Fig. 2.2). Thus, 
policies associated with the role will propagate and apply 
to the URD representing the user. Note that there may be 
propagated policies applying to a position domain (and to 
the URDs included in that domain) which are not a 
component of the role associated with that position. For 
example the College policy for the use of computers 
propagates to all the research students but is not a specific 
part of the authorisations of their research role. Similarly, 
a Professor having her URD included in other 
organisational domains (research groups, experts on a 
particular subject) will be subject to other policies than 
those specified within the role(s) she is assigned to. 
Multiple URDs may be included in a RPD to represent the 
sharing of a position by a number of people and a URD 
can be included in several RPDs if the person performs 
multiple roles [2, 41. 
2.5 Simultaneous role sessions 
When a user logs into a system, a process acting as an 
adapter object between the user and the system e.g. login 
shell is created within the URD. Note that according to 
Fig. 2.2 this object inherits the access rights associated 
with all the roles in which the URD is included. This 
implies that an action could be performed in a role with 
access rights inherited from another role. This is not 
desirable and contradicts the concept of a role as a 
consistent set of access rights needed to perform the role's 
tasks. The activities related to different roles should be 
presented separately to the user e.g. each role has its own 
window and the security system must be able to 
distinguish in which role the user is acting so as to only 
use the access rights relating to that role. 
This can be achieved by keeping the URD out of the 
FWD and instead specifying a policy permitting the URD 
to create an agent within an RPD to which it has been 
assigned. This policy has the RPD as target and is not part 
of the role's policies. The adapter object in the URD is 
similar to an X server maintaining windows for each of the 
roles in which the user chooses to work. The connection 
shown between the adapter and agents in Fig. 2.3 does not 
imply remote communication - the objects could be 
implemented as threads within a single process but 
conceptually are members of different domains and so 
execute with the rights specific to the RPD. The menu 
within a window can be specific to a role and only display 
those operations permitted by the policies for that role. 
The role policies will also specify what target domains can 
be accessed from the role. 
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Role A Position 
Role B Position 
Domain 
Figure: 2.3 Multiple role sessions 
The role framework relies on the policy service and the 
domain structure. Roles are only visible at the specifica- 
tion level and are implemented as domains and policies for 
access control purposes. The security architecture does not 
have to know about roles and only sees domains and 
policies. 
3 Overview of the security architecture 
We take an approach to building the system in which 
distributed security is provided at the levels of the host 
manager and the application server. A Host Manager 
provides an Authentication Agent (AA) and an Access 
Control Agent (ACA) that are trusted to act on behalf of 
all application objects on its host and is accessed via a 
simple application programming interface (API). By 
transferring part of the security functionality into the host 
manager we minimise the size of the security components 
that must be replicated among the application servers and 
the number of principals (objects in this context) that have 
to be registered with the authentication service. 
Reference Monitor 
Application Server and Cryptographic 
Facilities (linked as a 
libZ!--L 
S 
Host Host 
Service Service Service 
Figure 3.1 : Security Architecture Overview 
The security agents are responsible for authenticating 
remote objects, determining access control policies apply- 
ing to subject-target pairs and establishing session keys to 
be used by subject-target pairs. The operation of these 
agents is supported by the Policy, the Domain and the 
Authentication Services (see Fig. 3.1). 
3.1 Policy Service 
Policy Objects are maintained within the servers of the 
policy service and are registered within domains. An 
administrator who has the necessary access privileges to 
the domain can create, edit, activate, disable and delete 
policies using a Policy Editor [ 5 ] .  When an (extended) 
access control policy is activated, it is distributed to the 
ACAs of the hosts maintaining objects to which the 
policy applies (see Fig. 3.2). The domain service is queried 
to determine which objects are in the subject, target and 
grantee scope of the policy. The scopes of an activated 
policy are re-evaluated every time the domain structure 
changes or the membership of a non-domain object 
changes. In addition, when a policy is disabled, special 
revocation tokens are propagated down the domain 
hierarchy and are eventually given to the ACAs of the 
objects in the scopes of the disabled policy. The effect is 
that the ACAs are continuously aware of the policies 
applying to the objects being maintained on their hosts. 
For a more detailed description of the policy propagation 
mechanism see also [9]. 
Figure 3.2: Policy Distribution to Subject and 
Target Access Control Agents 
3.2. Authentication Service 
The Authentication Service (AS) is used to authenticate 
users and remote authentication agents and verify the 
authenticity of delegation tokens and domain membership 
statements which form the basis for access control 
decisions. User authentication can be achieved either by 
passwords or smart cards that are capable of storing a key 
and performing cryptographic operations. When the 
identity of the user has been verified, the system makes the 
adapter object on the login workstation a member of the 
URD of the user. 
The AS is transparent to the application objects as only 
the authentication agents (AAs) interact with it. AAs are 
the only objects registered with the AS. This significantly 
reduces the size and update rate of the AS security database. 
Note that a high update rate of the security database 
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seriously affects the performance of the system as it 
involves expensive cryptographic operations (c.f [lo]). It 
is the responsibility of the user (or the object acting on her 
behalf) to create an application object on a node whose 
AA, ACA and system softwarehardware can be 
sufficiently trusted. An AA believes that the AA and ACA 
on a remote host are sufficiently trustworthy to act on 
behalf of the application objects on that node. The secrecy 
and integrity of communication between servers on the 
same node (for example between application and host 
manager server) is provided by the underlying system 
software and hardware which must be trusted anyway. 
An intra-realm authentication service that is based on 
symmetric cryptography and employs replicated authentica- 
tion servers with minimal state is being developed. It uses 
Private-key Certificates [I  11 to disperse the security 
database so that the on-line authentication servers need to 
maintain no state apart from their master key, thus 
simplifying server replication as there is no state 
consistency problem. Further, it permits very simple, 
replicated tamper-proof machines to be used as authentica- 
tion servers and as translators (relays) [6]. The relay 
function of the AS is of great importance in the security 
architecture as it allows domain membership verification 
without establishing shared secret keys between the verifier 
and the domain servers. Specifically, membership 
statements encrypted with the secret keys of the AAs of 
the domain servers, certifying the claimed membership, 
can be re-encrypted by the AS with the secret key of the 
verifier. In addition, the push method [6] can be employed 
whereby the claimant can collect the necessary certificates 
which can later be re-encrypted by the AS with the secret 
key of the verifier. A similar mechanism is used to verify 
the delegation tokens that are encrypted under the secret 
key of the grantor AAs. 
Each AA shares a secret key with the AS and so 
authentication between AAs can be achieved by using a 
protocol described in [I21 which is similar to that 
employed by the Kerberos system [13]. The main 
difference is that the authentication server in our system is 
psovided with the private-key certificates that contain the 
secret keys of the AAs involved in the protocol. 
The authentication service could be based on 
asymmetric cryptography which eliminates the need for 
network interaction with on-line authentication servers. 
However, it dramatically increases the encryption/ 
decryption time (symmetric encryption is considered to be 
1000-5000 times faster than asymmetric cryptography [6]). 
AS our system supports multiple domain membership 
authentication as well as delegation, a relatively large 
number of membership certificates and delegation tokens 
are generated and verified for each secure channel (see 
Section 3.3). Thus, use of an asymmetric cryptosystem 
would significantly increase the processing required for 
secure channel establishment. 
3.3 Security Agents and secure channels 
We use a secure channel between a subject and a target 
to represent authentication, cryptographic, access control 
and domain membership information. Each channel has a 
unique identifier (CHID) which can be used as a reference 
to the information related to the channel. The subject 
initiating an invocation on a target requests the 
establishment of a secure channel which involves both the 
AA and ACA. The subject and target can then exchange 
messages which are encrypted and decrypted by the 
Cryptographic facilities (CFs) in their address space. The 
access control decision for each invocation is made by the 
Reference Monitor (RM) in the address space of the target, 
based on channel related access control information 
provided by the target ACA. The cryptographic and RM 
facilities are linked as a library into each application 
server. 
The type and degree of the communication security 
required e.g. integrity or secrecy is application dependent. 
Use of encryption may be precluded for perfonnance 
seasons or by legislation, so the subject requesting a 
channel can specify the level of security that the channel 
should support. 
CHID, 1 
Policies 
Figure 3.3: Application Server Facilities and 
Secure Communication 
AAs establish channel keys on behalf of the application 
objects and can easily verify whether a remote 
authenticated AA is trusted to act on behalf of an object 
whose OID and location are known. A remote AA is 
always trusted to act on behalf of all objects on its host, 
so an AA simply checks whether the network address of 
the authenticated remote agent matches the address of the 
object with which a channel has to be established. If 
mutual trust between the two agents has been established, 
they proceed to choose a channel key and a CHID. These 
are given to the cryptographic facilities of the two 
application objects (see Fig. 3.3). The CHID generated by 
the subject AA is based on its host name and a sequence 
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number. AAs also perform verification of object 
membership in domains using the Domain Service. A 
description of the membership verification mechanism is 
given in [12]. 
The ACAS hold copies of the access control policies 
applying to the objects on their nodes. The target ACA 
determines the policies that apply to an established channel 
once the subject has been authenticated and its domain 
membership verified by the target AA. These policies are 
given to the RM in the address space of the target to make 
the final access control decision for each invocation on the 
established channel (see Fig. 3.3). The subject ACA 
determines the set of policies relating to the channel i.e. 
the Pseudo-Capability List which contains the OIDs of the 
policies applying to the subject. These are provided as a 
hint to reduce the number of policies applying to the target 
that have to be checked by the target ACA. A detailed 
description of the access control mechanism is given [9] 
which also describes how the mechanism has been 
extended to make access control decisions when delegation 
is involved. 
4 Conclusion 
We have given an overview of an access control model 
for distributed object systems and a security architecture 
that is being developed in the CORBA distributed 
programming environment. The access control model is 
based on the notion of domains to specify access control 
policies for groups of objects which may be subjects or 
targets. Our domains are more flexible and powerful than 
the group concept traditionally used in access control and 
can be used to partition responsibility or reflect the 
structure of large-scale enterprises. The power of the 
domain concept is indicated in the fact that it can be used 
to model positions and roles, such that the security service 
only has to know about domains. 
Our authorisation polices provide a very flexible means 
of specifying access control permissions and include 
constraints to limit their applicability. They can also be 
extended to specify delegation policy. Policies explicitly 
identify both subjects and targets, and domains maintain 
information about the policies applying to them so it is 
easy to analyse the policies to determine those applying to 
a specific object. 
Roles and inter-role relationships are used for the 
representation of the organisational structure. The role 
framework is combined with the ability to refine 
organisational policies from an abstract level to enactable 
rules for a full representation of the organisational 
structure, organisational policies and the assignment of 
responsibilities to managers. 
The security system consists of four main building 
blocks. The Policy Service which maintains and 
distributes policy objects, the Domain Service which 
maintains domain objects and certifies domain 
membership, the Authentication Service and security 
agents that are employed on a per host basis. The 
Authentication Service is based on symmetric 
cryptography to minimise the encryption overhead and it is 
provided by on-line servers with minimal state to facilitate 
replication. The distributed security provided by the system 
is transparent to the application level and APIs are 
provided to facilitate the development of security unaware 
applications. 
Acknowledgements 
We gratefully acknowledge financial support from the 
Swiss Bank Corporation (London), EPSRC Roleman 
project (GWK 37512) and BT MMN project. 
References 
J. Moffett, M. Sloman, “User and Mechanism Views of 
Distributed System Management”, IEE/IOP/BCS 
Distributed Systems Engineering, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 37- 
47, Aug. 1993. 
M. S. Sloman, “Policy Driven Management for 
Distributed Systems,” Journal of Network and Systems 
Management, vol. 2, no. 4, pp. 333-360, Dec. 1994. 
E. Lupu, D. Marriott, M. Sloman, and N. Yialelis, “A 
Policy Based Role Framework for Access Control,” First 
ACM/NIST Role Based Access Control Workshop, 
Gaithersburg, USA, Dec. 1995. 
E Lupu and M. Sloman, “Towards a Role Based 
Framework for Distributed Systems Management,” To 
appear in: Plenum Press Journal of Network aid Systems 
Management, vol. 5 ,  no 1 ,  1997 
D. Marriott and M. Sloman, “Management Policy Service 
for Distributed Systems,” IEEE Third Int. Workshop on 
Services in Distributed ard Networked Environments 
(SDNE’96), June 1996, Macau, pp. 2-9 
B. Lampson, M. Abadi, M. Burrows, and E. Wobber, 
“Authentication in Distributed Systems: Theory and 
Practice,” ACM Trans. on Computer Systems, vol. 10, 
no. 4, pp. 265-310, Nov. 1992. 
B. J. Biddle and E. J. Thomas, “Role Theory: Concepts 
and Research,” New York. Robeit E. Krieger Publishing 
Company, 1979. 
R. Sandhu, E. Coyne, H. Feinstein, C. Youman “Role 
Based Access Control Models”, IEEE Computer vol. 29, 
no. 2, pp. 38-47, Feb. 1996. 
N Yialelis and M. Sloman, “A Security Framework 
Supporting Domain-Based Access Control in Distributed 
Systems,” IEEE ISOC Symposium on Network and 
Distributed Systems Security’96, San Diego, pp. 26-34, 
Feb. 1996. 
[ 101 R. Deng, S. Bhonsle, W. Wang and A. Lazar, “Integrating 
Security in CORBA Based Object Architecture”, IEEE 
Symposium on Security and Privacy, pp. 50-61, 1995. 
[ l l ]  D. Davis and R Swick, “Network Security via Private- 
Key Certificates,” ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems 
Review, vol. 24, no. 4, pp. 64-67, Oct. 1990. 
[ 121 N .  Yialelis and M. Sloman, “An Authentication Service 
Supporting Domain Based Access Control Policies,” 
Imperial College, Research Report DOC 95/13, Sep. 
1995, 
[ 131 C. Neuman and T. Ts’o, “Kerberos: An Authentication 
Service for Computer Networks,” IEEE Communications 
Magazine, vol. 32,  no. 9, pp. 33-38, Sept. 1994. 
85 
Authorized licensed use limited to: Imperial College London. Downloaded on June 25,2010 at 07:38:56 UTC from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply. 
